



Director of
Central
Intelligence

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National Intelligence Daily

Thursday
8 November 1984

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8 November 1984

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Date JUN 1999

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
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
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
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CHILE:

Regime Tightens Political Controls

The state of siege and the reappointments of the Cabinet give President Pinochet a temporary advantage over the opposition, but they may further polarize the country and eventually reduce his ability to delay the transition to democratic rule.

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The state of siege has been imposed in reaction to terrorist actions last week and to alleged efforts by democratic opposition groups to destabilize the government. The 90-day measure strengthens the regime's arbitrary powers, notably the right to imprison dissidents in secret locations indefinitely.

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Pinochet also has imposed a midnight-to-dawn curfew in major cities and has called out the Army to enforce it.

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Pinochet's actions reflect his determination to clamp down on leftist extremists, to slow the transition to democratic rule, and to minimize the fallout from a forced reorganization of the Cabinet. Pressure from the junta evidently forced Pinochet to back away from dropping Jarpa from the Cabinet.

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In order to persuade Jarpa to stay on, Pinochet may have had to make commitments to speed up the transition timetable. Whether he will abide by any such commitments or whether Jarpa will stay in the Cabinet remains uncertain.

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Pinochet's actions have further polarized Chilean politics by strengthening radicals advocating violence and by weakening those favoring a negotiated transition.

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
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USSR: Leadership Lineup

The political leadership lineup at the Revolution Day celebrations in Moscow yesterday was nearly identical to last year's except for the absence of the reportedly ill Defense Minister Ustinov. Party secretary Gorbachev ranked higher than secretary Romanov but lower than members of the Politburo's old guard. First Deputy Defense Minister Sokolov substituted for Ustinov and took precedence over the other two first deputies, General Staff Chief Akhromeyev and Warsaw Pact Commander Kulikov. Unlike them, Sokolov holds no public military position other than that of a first deputy minister.

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The political lineup indicates that Gorbachev remains senior to Romanov despite Gorbachev's low profile at the Central Committee meeting last month. Sokolov's prominence, at the expense of Akhromeyev and Kulikov, suggests that he has emerged as a strong professional military claimant to succeed Ustinov. Sokolov's full duties are unclear, although since early 1980 he has been the senior Defense Ministry official concerned with Afghanistan. The senior political leadership may feel more comfortable with the 73-year-old Sokolov than with his younger colleagues.

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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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In Brief

Americas

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Africa

- Hundreds of thousands of blacks in South Africa's Transvaal Province participated in two-day work boycott ... may prompt further calls for general strike ... 16 blacks died in rioting during boycott ... security forces have sealed off six black townships.

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Middle East

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- [REDACTED] Tunisian President Bourguiba remains hospitalized but not in serious condition ... expected to recover quickly from what may have been attack of angina ... government continues to operate normally.

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Europe

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- Lisbon moving to crack down on activities in Portugal of Mozambican National Resistance ... may bring criminal charges against Portuguese spokesmen for group ... worried about worsening relations with Mozambique if antiregime activity not curbed.

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East Asia

- Japanese sperm whalers have resumed operations, ending self-imposed moratorium ... could take up to 400 sperm whales this season because of continued failure to agree with US on this year's quota and on eventual end to whaling.

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Special Analysis

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
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
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Special Analysis

SYRIA-LEBANON-
IRAN:

Syria and the Hizballah

Sharp differences between Syrian and Shia extremists on goals and tactics in Lebanon have led to increasing tension and occasional violent clashes over the past six months. Damascus has facilitated operations of the Iranian-backed Hizballah in an effort to advance its own interests in Lebanon, but Shia terrorism now is interfering with Syrian plans. Damascus, however, probably fears that moving too forcefully against the Hizballah would alienate Iran and prompt the terrorists to start targeting Syrians.

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Damascus permits the Hizballah and its Iranian Revolutionary Guard allies to proselytize and prepare terrorist operations from bases in the Syrian-controlled Bekaa Valley.

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A Double-Edged Sword

The Hizballah terrorist network has provided Damascus with an effective but double-edged weapon of coercion in Lebanon. The Syrians almost certainly believe that suicide attacks by Shia extremists drove the Multinational Force out of Beirut last winter. Shia violence also keeps pressure on Israeli forces in southern Lebanon.

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Damascus has used the threat of radical Shia terrorism to put pressure on the Lebanese Government and on moderate Shia leader Nabih Barri during the past year.

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The long-term objectives of the Hizballah, however, are fundamentally incompatible with Syria's policy on Lebanon. Syrian leaders are determined to stabilize the security situation in and around Beirut and no longer welcome any and all disruptive activities by Shia extremists.

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Damascus supports Lebanese President Amin Gemayel and the present Cabinet. The Hizballah, on the other hand, remains committed to overthrowing the Lebanese Government by force and establishing an Iranian-style Islamic republic.

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
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Syrian troops and Hizballah fighters have clashed several times, and Damascus has partially curtailed the radicals' freedom of movement since last summer. Nonetheless, Damascus has failed to move decisively against Hizballah terrorists and continues to allow Iranian Revolutionary Guards to train and indoctrinate Lebanese Shias in areas under its control.

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Dangers to Syria

Syrian leaders are reluctant to try to suppress the Hizballah because they still believe they can manipulate the radical Shia movement to Syria's advantage. They also are concerned that a total crackdown would damage the Syrian-Iranian relationship and might jeopardize the special economic benefits—such as high-quality oil at low prices—that Syria obtains from Iran.

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In addition, a Syrian move against the Hizballah could prompt the terrorist network to begin to target Syrians or Syrian interests. Radical Shia leaders have not concealed their contempt for the secular Syrian state.

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